Dry solutions for drought relief--institutional innovation in relief delivery in Ceará, Brazil by Wade, Ruth H. (Ruth Helena)
DRY SOLUTIONS FOR DROUGHT RELIEF:
INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION IN RELIEF DELIVERY IN
CEARA, BRAZIL
by
Ruth H. Wade
B.A., Sociology & Anthropology, Swarthmore College,
(1991)
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
MASTER IN CITY PLANNING
at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
June 1993
© Ruth H. Wade 1993
All rights reserved
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to distribute publicly
copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.
Signature of Attho
Certified bv
r
De artment of Urban Studies and Planning
May 17, 1993
7fPro er Judith Tendler
Thesis Supervisor
Accepted b:
77 i-cK
Professor Ralph Gakenheimer
Chairman, Master in City Planning Committee
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY
[JUN 03 1993
UBRARIES
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Many people enabled me to complete the research and writing of this thesis.
Much appreciation goes to my advisor, Judith Tendler, who packed me in her Brazil-
bound Samsonite and introduced me to rigorous field research and analysis. Only her
suppliers of green-ink pens know for sure how many written drafts she painstakingly
critiqued. One cannot imagine the indelible impact that her scholarship has had on me.
I would like to thank my readers, Professor Paul Smoke and Mary Anderson,
whose perspectives made me reflect on the issues a little differently, and a great deal
more wisely. To Meenu Tewari, who provided precise and stimulating feedback,
Eduardo Beteta who set us on track in Ceard, and to Gabrielle Watson, for sharing her
field wisdom, thank you.
Research was made possible in Ceard by the kind assistance of the Governor of
Ceard, Dr. Ciro Gomes, Dr. Antonio Rocha Magalhies, Dr. Ant6nio Claudio Ferreira
Lima and the staff of IPLANCE and CEDEC. Much appreciation goes to Dr. Jos6 Rosa
Abreu Vale, Dr. Joio Nicedio Nogueira, Dr. Jorge Hauser Rodrigues de Araujo Sherlock,
and Dr. Eduardo Jos6 Ferreira dos Santos who clarified the information and Maria Lucia
Oliveira Chaves who described in vivid detail the drought of 1987. To all who allowed
me to hang my rede (hammock) on your hooks, thank you.
I am eternally grateful to my colleagues in Ceard and Cambridge who helped my
field notes evolve into findings: MOnica Amorim, Julia Bucknall, Octavio Damiani,
Silvia Dorado, Sara Freedheim and Sandra Zarur.
Thanks also to Kofi, who willingly waded through my drafts and remained
supportive throughout, and to Jeffrey and Leonor for their encouragement, even when I
hid the precious last coffee filters.
Lastly, and most importantly, many thanks to my parents, who remortgaged the
house for my education, giving "sacrifice" a new meaning, and constantly insisted, "Age
Quod Agis."
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
ACRONYMS
ABSTRACT
Chapter
1. Introduction and Methodology .................................. 6--.----------------....6
2. Drought Relief in Ceard Prior to 1987:
Centralized Administration, Widespread Problems .................................. 14
Droughts and their implications for Ceard ................... 14
Stories from the field--flaws in program execution ...................... 16
3. PAPCS. The 1987-1988 Drought Relief Program ................................. 20
The institutional framework .............................................. 23
The steps leading to the execution of projects ...................... 24
Relief administration backed by a change in approach .......... 30
4. Community Participation: Giving Victims a Say ................................ 33
Why did the participatory method work in PAPCS? .............. 34
How did participation enhance supervision? ...................... 38
Participation led people to make further demands ...................... 40
5. The GACs: Municipal "Overseers" of Relief .............................................. 42
How did the GACs help PAPCS? .............................................. 42
Varied interests maintained groups' balance ...................... 47
GACs--temporary or permanent? ............................................. 51
6. Giving Credence to an Existing Network. The Case of EMATERCE ........... 53
Factors making EMATERCE's role advantageous .............. 54
EMATERCE's status contributed to good performance .......... 60
CONCLUSION ...........................-----.........--..... 62
. ..........................................---...... 64REFERENCES
.......................................---...------.----------------------------------..
2
.. . ... .. ....... ................................--.------... 
.....-- 
- - - - - - - - -- - - - -
- - - -  - - - - - - -
- ........5..................... . ............................ .. .. .. 4
ACRONYMS
AUMEF
CEDEC
CEMINAS
COHAB
DAER
EMATERCE
FUNCEME
GAC
GAI
GESCAP
NUTEC
PAPCS
PAPP
REFSA
SAS
SEPLAN
SOHIDRA
SUCAM
Agency for the Metropolitan Region of Fortaleza, now SEDURB
State Coordinator for Civil Defense
Mining Company of Ceard
Ceard State Agency for Housing
Department of Highways and Roadways
Ceard Agency for Technical Assistance and Rural Extension
Meteorological Agency of Ceard
Community Action Group
Group for Inter institutional Articulation
Special Groups for Aid to Victims of Public Disasters
Ceard Agency for Industrial Technology
Program for Permanent Actions to Combat the Drought
Support Program for Small Farmers
Railway Service
Department of Social Programs
Department of Planning and Coordination
Department of Water Resources
Agency for Public Health Campaigns
DRY SOLUTIONS FOR DROUGHT RELIEF:
INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION IN RELIEF DELIVERY IN
CEARA, BRAZIL
by
RUTH WADE
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the
Degree of Master in City Planning
ABSTRACT
This thesis looks at how the state of Ceard, Brazil increased the effectiveness of its
drought relief program in 1987. The program had traditionally been marred by clientelistic
behavior of state and municipal politicians and landowners. However, in 1987 the state
went beyond delivering the standard humanitarian relief and hiring a large number of
unemployed drought victims to work on public works projects as it had in the past, and
attacked the socio-political variables that had consistently distorted the relief delivery.
The Department of Social Programs, in charge of the relief effort, shifted some of
the critical decisions regarding relief away from the larger state institutions and municipal
elites, and allowed municipal committees which represented various interest groups and
classes, and drought victims to select projects and beneficiaries for the employment
scheme. The state also expanded the role of agricultural extension agents to include relief
administration. In so doing, the state used available field agents to do a job for which they
were well suited, professionally and logistically, as they already worked in the state's most
drought stricken areas. In addition to tailoring the projects more closely to local needs, and
employing the neediest rural residents, these features also gave rise to accountability and
precise project monitoring. Furthermore, creating these new municipal roles enhanced the
flow of information regarding the relief program going to and from the central level.
Although decentralized decision making and participation are often considered risky
and time consuming, the drought relief program worked well precisely because the state
promoted these strategies, which allowed previously excluded or undermined players at the
municipal level to take part in shaping relief.
Thesis Supervisor: Judith Tendler
Title: Professor of Political Economy
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY
Drought in the Northeast is not caused by a lack of rainfall.1
Statement made by countless Cearenses
Hunger, poverty and widespread distress that exists for our class is not a result of the
drought... 2
(Campones 1981)
For many rural residents in Ceard, Northeast Brazil, the explanations for the
state's persistent poverty have less to do with the state's chronic low supply of water, and
more to do with factors that thwart attempts to solve the drought problem. Rural
residents consider the drought as something beyond their control. They don't, however,
accept the obstacles blocking its alleviation. They believe that the government's attempts
to increase the number of large water storage facilities and water delivery trucks in
drought relief programs are futile unless the government prevents large landowners and
politicians from "relief skimming"--controlling water storage facilities, and hand-picking
the workers for the state's emergency employment schemes. This thesis shows that the
solutions to Cearda' s drought had less to do with the continued construction of water
storage facilities or deploying an increased number of water delivery trucks, and more to
do with simple institutional changes or "dry" solutions.
Admittedly, the rural, non-coastal region of Ceard (hereafter referred to as
"interior") suffers from inadequate rainfall. On average, it experiences five to ten very
dry months each year, during which time even the largest rivers dry up (Hirschman 1963,
14), and four to seven humid months when 95% of the precipitation occurs (Kampen and
Krantz in Carvalho 1988, 65). Only about 685 mm of rain fall during the rainy seasons3
which is adequate for temperate England, but inadequate for regions like tropical Ceard,
1A seca no Nordeste ndo 9 por causa da falta de chuva.
2A fome, a mistria e a calamidade puiblica que existe na nossa classe, ndo f causada pela seca...
3The annual rainy period extends from January to May.
which experience rapid evaporation (Hirschman 1963). Ceard also experiences severe
periodic droughts, 4 during which some municipios5 receive as little as 1 mm of rainfall in
an entire year (IPLANCE 1989, 39). Sometimes, as in the 1979-1983 drought, these
extreme conditions extend over several years, offering little respite to facilitate recovery.
Occasionally, as in the drought of 1987-1988, the rainfall in the state is enough to make
the vegetation green, but not enough to produce a harvest. 6
Ceard's characteristics exacerbate the effect of the drought. It is one of Brazil's
poorest states and has a GDP per capita of US$1,182 (1990), 40% of that of Brazil's
average (IBGE 1990). One third of the state's population of 6.5 million is rural,7 with as
much as 80% of the rural population earning below the minimum wage (PNAD 1989).
Adult literacy in the state is 61%, behind Brazil's average of 81%, and as much as 45% of
the state's economically active population (and most of the rural population) depend on
agricultural production as their main source of income (Campos, Khan, and Fraga 1988).
Ceard has a life expectancy rate of 54 years, 10 years less than the national
average, (IBGE 1990) and has an infant mortality rate of 65 per 1,000 live births (IBGE
1990), eight higher than the national average (World Bank 1992) and on par with
countries such as Guatemala and Kenya. The drought worsens this condition and many
rural residents attest to losing one child or more "to the drought."
The high level of dependency on agriculture in the rural area coupled with high
rates of unemployment during severe droughts forces rural residents to migrate to the
4Some say that severe droughts occur once every seven years, while others say once every three
years. Hirschman (1963, 13) says once every ten years.
5Throughout the text the term municipio will be used to denote an administrative district, headed
by an elected mayor and elected councilpersons. In Ceard, there are 178 municpios ranging in population
from 5,000 to roughly 100,000 in the larger interior municipios (IPLANCE 1989). (Fortaleza is the
exception with almost 2 million people). Each municipio has several surrounding districts, which are
further broken down into communities of varying sizes (as few as five families or as many as 200).
Municipios are "the only unit of local government in Brazil which generally contain both an urban and rural
area (Ferguson 1990, 1)."
6This is known as the Seca Verde, or the "Green Drought."
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"Rural" in the statistical data refers to any area other than the capital city, Fortaleza, and the
urban centers in the interior. For the most part in this thesis however, "rural" will be used generally to
describe the interior.
larger towns in the interior (sedes),8 to Fortaleza and other capital cities in the country. In
1970 Ceard was 53% urban and by 1990, it was 63% urban (IPLANCE 1989).9 Between
1970 and 1980 the sedes and Fortaleza grew 5.0% and 4.3% per annum respectively' 0
Towards the end of the five-year drought in 1983, 300,000 victims entered Fortaleza
(Flichman 1977) contributing to the 600,000 social and economic "outcasts" in Fortaleza,
double the number of the previous year (Foweraker 1982).11
Since 190612 the Federal government has funded emergency relief programs to
provide humanitarian assistance to drought victims, (namely water for human
consumption, and food supplies), and to create emergency employment programs so that
victims could earn roughly the minimum wage while carrying out public works projects
(water facility construction and highway maintenance).13 In 1983 the Federal
Government allocated US$351,895 million 14 for drought relief efforts to the entire
Northeast region whose states experience conditions similar to that of Ceard.
Relief delivery however, has experienced many problems. First, much of the
money destined for drought relief ended up in the hands of local landowners and
politicians once it reached the municipios and ended up being used for non drought-
related projects. Second, many of the jobs in the employment scheme went to individuals
8From now on, the word sede will be used to denote the administrative center of each municipio.
State statistics consider this part of the municipio "urban" when it makes a rural/urban distinction in
population figures.
90fficials gave the impression that the migration rate was much higher, but it is possible that these
figures do not account for people who migrate temporarily when the drought is at its worst. Furthermore,
these figures do not account for the fact that many drought victims migrate to cities outside of Ceari.
10Other Northeast states show lower urban interior growth figures between 1970 and 1980. Piauf
experienced 4.6% growth per annum in its urban interior, and Pernambuco, 3.9%. In terms of capital cities
experiencing growth, Fortaleza was second to Teresina in Piauf (6.5%) and greater than Recife in
Pernambuco (1.2%)(Carvalho 1988, 175). Brazil as a whole shows an urban growth rate of 3.4%, and
Mexico, 2.9% between 1980 and 1990 (World Bank 1992). These figure do not accurately represent
residents who migrate solely for the duration of the droughts.
1This is not unlike the general profile of the Northeast. While in 1872 the Northeast population
constituted almost 50% of Brazil's population, by 1980 the Northeast population comprised only 29% of
Brazil's population (Carvalho 1988, 14).
12For more information about the history of relief see Carvalho (1988) and Magalhaes (1991).
13See Thomas (1986) for a discussion of public works employment for humanitarian relief, and
Clay (1986) for an overview of the employment component of Food for Work programs.141n 1987 US$. The figure was Cr$1,558,592 million in 1984 Cr$. The consumer index for 1984
was .0116, and the consumer index for 1987 was .2569. Cr$1000=Cz$1. The average conversion rate in
1987-1988 was US$1=Cz$98.09.
hand-picked by municipal landowners and politicians. Third, many of the projects that
the workers in the employment schemes undertook were more appropriate for large
landowners who individually owned more than ten hectares of land but constituted only
constituted about one third of all farmers in Ceard (IBGE 1990).15
However, according to rural residents, in 1987 Ceard overcame many of the
problems that had plagued relief delivery for decades. It did so in spite of being a poor,
less developed state where large landowners and elite industrialists dominated the state's
development, and where much municipal political action based itself on clientelistic
motives 16 (Ferguson 1990, 5), and in spite of receiving less annual funding than it had in
the previous drought relief program.17 Since many public administrators in developing
nations attribute the failure of government programs to a lack of financial resources, and
to manipulative politicians and elites, the ways in which the government of Ceard
circumvented these problems provides important lessons.
Like previous administrations, the 1987 administration believed that the drought
was not only an agricultural and meteorological phenomenon, but also a social, political
and economic one (Magalhies 1991, 36). The difference, however, was that none of the
previous administrations had ever articulated this institutionally as the 1987
administration did. Therefore, although the special aims of the 1987 program were
essentially the same as always (providing the standard humanitarian relief and creating an
employment scheme under which workers engaged in projects ranging from the
construction of small wells to road maintenance) the new institutional approach made a
great difference to the quality of relief. It even compensated for the fact that the state
15Tendler (1982b) explains how elites interfere with public sector programs.16For example, "Clientelistic mayors customarily distribute(ed) local public works contracts as
patronage, fill(ed) city halls with relatives, friends, and political allies, and (left) heavy debt, disorganized
administrative systems, and broken equipment to their successors...Clientelisitc politicians (kept) people
isolated, refusing to deal with groups that might compete for their power. Few organizations (existed) in
most small and medium-sized municipalities. Thus, clientelism (discouraged) the organization and
collective action necessary for many types of local development (Ferguson 1990, 5).
17According to state officials.
reduced employment in the scheme to representatives of 40% (235,000)18 of the 600,000
drought-stricken families (Magalhies 1991, 34,65), down from almost 100% in the
previous drought of 1983.19 The major institutional differences between the 1987
drought relief program and that of pre-1987 are summarized below.
First, instead of implementing the relief program via the Departments of
Agriculture and Water, the government assigned the program to the Department of Social
Programs, which had supervisory responsibility of the State Coordinator of Civil Defense
(the agency that deals with emergencies). 20 That department also temporarily adopted
various drought-associated state agencies for the emergency, and paid closer attention to
the welfare aspects of the drought.
Second, the state created a program that not only encouraged formal project
supervision, but also gave rise to natural checks and balances throughout the planning
and implementation process through the following means:
a) The state allowed rural residents, for the first time, to participate actively in the
planning stages of the relief program. The state encouraged them to select the projects
that they wanted to work on and to select from among themselves the people who most
needed employment.
b) The state created committees, or Community Action Groups (GACs, Grupos de
Agdo Comunitaria) in most drought stricken municipios for the specific purpose of
monitoring and coordinating the 1987-1988 drought program at the municipal level. The
12 volunteers in each committee represented various interest groups and income levels
and acted as liaisons for the Department of Social Programs based in the capital city,
Fortaleza.
18This number is as much as half the number of workers assisted by USAI) in the 1984 Food for
Work Program in the entire India (Thomas 1986, 11).
19People said that in comparison with the later drought relief program of 1987, the state employed
more people than in the 1979-1983 period. In 1983, 3 million people were employed for the entire
Northeast, whereas in 1987, only 1 million were employed (Magalhes 1991, 65).
20From a conversation with a state official.
c) The state strengthened the role of agricultural extension agents in drought
relief, utilizing their experience in the field as a vital resource.
This thesis will explain how these institutional changes had an impact on relief
delivery in Ceard, Brazil.
METHODOLOGY
The research for this thesis was conducted over a three month period, from June
to August 1992. I spent the first month in the capital, Fortaleza, to gain an understanding
of the structure of the program from state officials. I spent the remaining two months in
two municipios, Iguatu and Taud, and traveling throughout the interior of Ceard, making
brief stops along the way to meet with local officials and visit sites and buildings that had
been constructed under the 1987 drought relief program and speaking with agricultural
extension agents, GAC members, and farmers and their families.
I selected the two main municipios, Iguatu and Taud as my cases for the following
reasons:
a) I chose two municipios that officials had identified as "successes," since this
study examined the program's accomplishments and what state officials had "done right"
in designing the program. They came closest to exemplifying the aims of the drought
program. State-level officials and civil servants also noted the two GAC leaders there as
outstanding, and critical to the program's success.
b) Relative to other municipios they were similar in population size, falling in the
mid-size range of municipios. Taud has population of 51,326, and Iguatu, 75,662 (IBGE
1991).
c) Both municipios received rainfall below the average for the region; Taud was
one of the hardest hit municipios in the entire state in 1987.
Information for the paper was gathered from close to 100 respondents ranging
from farmers, to state employees and government officials. The literature I surveyed
comprised government documents and books on Ceard and the drought, in addition to the
more general development literature.
Like the administrators of the 1987 relief program (SEPLAN 1989, 35) I found
that there were limited published details of pre-1987 relief programs; in such cases I
relied on respondents. However, one of the major difficulties in the research stemmed
from the fact that the 1987 drought occurred over four years ago, a short period in history
books, yet a long period for those trying to remember the details, particularly since, in
their estimation, severe droughts are so frequent. The majority of respondents said at
various points during the course of the interviews that they simply could not remember
the details.
As a result of all this, it was sometimes difficult for me to distinguish the official
guidelines from what actually took place in the drought relief program. For example,
there were people who argued that both past programs and the 1987 program paid
workers one minimum wage and those who argued that they both, or one but not the
other, paid half a minimum wage. (The discrepancy perhaps also points to a difference
between the programs' intentions and the actual circumstances.) In general few were able
to detail exactly how the programs were supposed to be run.
I feel that retrospect and nostalgia on the part of respondents interfered somewhat
with the retrieval of critical details of the 1987 program. Many people gave their overall
and positive impressions of the 1987 program in comparison with other programs, and
sometimes confused the finer details of both programs. However, by cross referencing
and repeating the same questions to various respondents, I got substantial data.
As a sociologist, I feel very strongly about observations. But I obviously could
not observe the events of 1987 and relied heavily on people's own interpretations of the
drought of 1987. In some instances I have drawn on observations from the 1990 and
current 1992-93 drought relief program and the current work of extension agents to
explain various points.
The remaining chapters of this thesis elaborate on these key points and show how
the state changed the drought relief program of 1987-1988 and tempered the drought
conditions in the interior by focusing considerably more attention on the previous
obstacles of relief, and on the social welfare issues of poor residents in the interior.
Chapters two and three will look at the pre-1987 and 1987 drought relief programs, and
chapters four, five, and six, will look at victim participation at the stricken community
level, GAC involvement at the municipal level, and EMATERCE activity throughout the
municipios, including the communities.
CHAPTER TWO
DROUGHT RELIEF IN CEAR PRIOR TO 1987:
CENTRALIZED ADMINISTRATION, WIDESPREAD PROBLEMS
Here I will present a profile of Ceard's drought condition and show how relief
programs prior to 1987 fared, before explaining in the following chapter how the 1987
drought relief program constituted a great improvement in Ceard's relief efforts.
Droughts and their Implications for Ceara
Droughts are different from other types of natural disasters like hurricanes and
floods. First, droughts take months or even longer to develop their full effect on
agriculture and nutrition. As emergencies go, droughts present substantial warning
allowing authorities the "luxury" of anticipating and planning ahead. Government
authorities can construct water facilities such as dams, irrigation and wells, they can
encourage the production of xerophilous (drought resistant) plants1 and animals that can
withstand the dry conditions.
The second difference is that droughts are prolonged. 2 This means that for an
extended length of time droughts affect people's activities. As with any prolonged crisis,
droughts often take their psychological toll on people.3 In the case of Ceard frustration
often results in migration to larger cities in search of employment. Many families in the
interior have family members living in major cities in and outside of the state.
Third, droughts disproportionately affect the poorer, subsistence agriculture
families who do not have permanent structures for storing water, have less access to
1For example, the Ceard government has encouraged the growth of the moc6 cotton tree, carnauba
palm, oiticia palm, carod cactus, and palma forrajeira, a cactus (Hirschman 1963, 17).
21n the case of Ceard, there was a five-year drought period, lasting from 1979-1983.
3Viewpoint of a victim and coordinators of local relief efforts. I also leamed this in conversations
with families who were either in families that had "lost" family members to the cities or knew people who
were left behind.
irrigation and who do not usually produce drought resistant crops. 4 Furthermore, the
poor are in a worse position to affect state intervention and policy regarding drought
relief.
What are the implications of droughts in a state like Cearda for the approach that
the government should take towards droughts? The state of Ceard focused on, first,
ensuring long term benefits through the construction of water and other facilities; second,
on designing projects from which the poor could benefit; third, on providing rural
residents with subsistence wages to reduce the level of migration.
Drought relief prior to 1987
Ceard received funding from the Federal Government once it declared an
emergency. The funding provided humanitarian relief, water and food, and employed
drought victims to work in employment schemes and earn subsistence wages. The
Department of Agriculture, and the Special Groups for Aid to Victims of Public Disasters
(Grupos Especiais de Socorro as Vitimas de Calamidades Publicas GESCAP), an
agency within the department, oversaw the projects in municipios and channeled money
to the municipios for projects and wages (Campones 1981). The Agency for Technical
Assistance and Rural Extension (Empresa de Assistincia Ticnica e Extensdo Rural,,
EMATERCE), 5 also in the Department of Agriculture, worked with GESCAP, providing
technical assistance for the projects.
For the most part, as in the case of the five-year drought from 1979-1983, workers
in the employment scheme prepared large private land for the upcoming agricultural
season, and constructed large dams, also on private property. In exchange for providing
free labor, the state required landowners to give the poor access to the dams (Carvalho
1988, 11).
4Paper by Grupo de Trabalho para o Desenvolvimiento do Nordeste (1978) mentioned in Campos,
Khan and Fraga (1988).
5This agency comprised agronomists, nutritionists and social workers stationed in the field.
Stories From the Field--Flaws in Program Execution.
Many factors reduced the effectiveness of the relief projects and employment
schemes. Some of the more commonly cited factors and their effects are explained
below.
Relief benefited the elites in the long run
Although the government intended for the poor to benefit from the projects, this
was not entirely the case. For example, when the government tried to encourage small
and medium sized landowners to participate by giving them relatively more assistance,
large landowners simply divided their land in order to qualify for the financial assistance
(Carvalho 1988, 254). Furthermore, once the dams were built, owners often denied
access to workers who had built them as well as to the neighboring communities.
At the end of the drought, large landowners benefited from both the dams and the
land clearance projects, and from the cheap labor that the program afforded them (Grupo
1959).6 Complaining about the government's decision to rely on landowners and build
on private land, one farmer said, "Logic would show that these facilities could never have
been for the public. How could you ever have public facilities on private property?"
(Campones 1981, 4). Another drought victim noted,
...these projects serve to make the people who are already rich, richer...the rich get free
labor to do whatever they please on their properties. They can do whatever they want
with the people employed during the emergencies (Campones 1981, 5).
Relief emphasized the traditional patron-client relationship
The large scale projects in the pre-1987 programs often required workers to live
away from away from home and their immediate communities. Because of this, they
spent most of their salary paying landowners for lodging and food that they bought on the
property. Landowners established dry goods stores and took on the role of suppliers, or
fornecedores, selling basic food items at inflated prices--almost 40% above normal
6Many public works programs raise the value of the land on which projects are done, benefiting
those owning the land to a greater extent than the landless (Clay 1986).
(Campones 1981).7 When the GESCAP agent paid farmers as many as 25 days late the
farmers ended up giving all their wages to the fornecedores (Campones 1981, 5) to cover
accumulated debt. This situation forced harsher conditions on many of the workers who
also had to support their families at home, perpetuating the level of dependency on
landowners that farmers had traditionally experienced, limiting the number of alternatives
for the poor, and raising, in this author's view, the level of vulnerability. 8
Inadequate supervision of landowners. funds. and workers.
Interview respondents said that they knew of cases in which landowners gained
control over emergency funding allocated for salaries. 9 For example, they would list 100
workers even when they really only had 30 workers and appropriate the wages of the 70
"ghost" workers. To the same effect, they would list family members as employees. In
both cases, the landowner hoarded the funding and used the money, "to build their
mansions in the city." 10
When selecting workers for projects, landowners often selected farmers according
to their political affiliation, employing workers in exchange for political support either for
themselves or their political colleagues. A farmer described the highly unequal
relationship between the landowners, politicians and workers as follows:
The job positions that GESCAP authorized came through the hands of (local) politicians,
and in order to gain employment, workers had to appeal to the landowners who were
intermediaries, and who were, many times the politicians themselves.
Those same landowners wanted facilities built on their land. Instead of the case
being that the workers went looking for work, it was the landowners who supplied the
land, went to the politicians and got the job slots to do the projects, or whatever they
wanted to do on their land, and went to GESCAP and registered their workers. Then the
workers did whatever the landowner wanted them to do on his land.
...If someone who wasn't a prominent landowner went to GESCAP to get slots,
they would send him to speak with the politicians, and simply ignore him. Everything
went via the politicians or landowners. And the povo (people) accepted this as though
they (the landowners) were doing them a big favor(Campones 1981).
7Campones says that while the regular price for 1 kg of rice was Cr$80, the fornecedores charged
Cr$110.
8For an analysis of vulnerability and disaster, see Anderson and Woodrow (1989). Also see
Chambers (1986) who argues that vulnerability exacerbates poverty.
9Clay (1986) notes that the likelihood of misappropriation is greater in wide scale projects than in
smaller schemes.
10Many people had stories about private buildings that were constructed with federal funding
during the emergency.
Powerful municipal landowners and politicians undermined field agents
Farmers argue that GESCAP workers were in league with landowners and
politicians. Supposedly, with GESCAP as mouthpieces, politicians could make decisions
that disfavored constituents without jeopardizing their votes and public image (Campones
1981). In some cases, landowners got GESCAP to pay workers for doing only half the
work and not to complete the work. GESCAP would then report to the state that workers
could not complete a project because of insufficient funds and apply for further funding
to complete the project (personal interview with extension agent).
However, a field agent speaking on behalf of both GESCAP and EMATERCE
agents in an attempt to explain the apparent "partnership" between agents and landowners
said,
Our hands were tied, and our roles as professionals taken away from us. It was very hard
for us to report corruption in the rural area to officials in Fortaleza since there were strong
links between rural and urban politicians and elites.
These powerful urban politicians, commonly referred to as coroniis (singular,
coronel), themselves often undermined decisions made by drought relief administrators
and technical civil servants in charge of drought relief in the field. For example, during
the 1979-1983 drought when a GESCAP agent tried to discourage the construction of a
water facility on the land of a particular landowner (because the dam would serve more
people were it built elsewhere during the five-year drought) a coronel, an acquaintance of
the landowner, transferred the GESCAP agent for having attempted to influence the
decision.
Elites however, were not the only ones who had learned to manipulate the
program. Some relief workers also knew how to take advantage of the program. The
1979-1983 drought relief program apparently hired a large proportion of victims11--as
much as 100% employment in some areas. This "opportunity" of unlimited employment
led to many cases of absenteeism as people took for granted that the state would pay them
11I say "apparently" because I wasn't able to get the exact figures. Some people said that there
was less than 100% employment while others said that in some towns there was 100% employment.
all, irrespective of performance. One respondent noted that as long as a farmer showed
up for a few days out of a week he would receive his full wages.12
The state did not fulfill its aims in providing relief and many of the projects did
not serve the poor in the short or long run. This was due to a lack of accountability both
at the state and municipal level and limited supervision to ensure that workers completed
their work, got paid, and benefited from the projects. For this reason, drought relief
programs were ineffective, resulting in poor nutrition and starvation, and migration out of
the region.
In 1987, a change in political leadership, a growing trend toward democratization
and a desire and commitment on the part of political leaders towards solving the
problems of the rural poor enabled the state to attack some of the social, political and
economic obstacles that hindered relief efforts. The following chapter looks at the 1987
drought relief program and its institutional adjustments.
12Whereas this may seem to contradict the story above, it is important to note that circumstances
varied across municpios and communities.
CHAPTER THREE
PAPCS. THE 1987-1988 DROUGHT RELIEF PROGRAM
Tasso Ribeiro Jereissati became Governor of Ceard in 1986, marking the end to
years of authoritarian leadership. Amidst a flurry of propaganda proclaiming great
mudangas (transformations) 1 he announced that the administration would sharpen its
approach toward Ceard's interior in order to alleviate the poor conditions resulting from
the drought, such that the rural poor would not starve or have to migrate to the capital
city, Fortaleza.
On May 29, 1987, during his first year of administration, the severity of Ceard's
drought reached emergency proportions. The governor reported the emergency to the
Federal Government (Tel6s 1988) who responded by giving Ceard US$48,302,5792 for
emergency drought relief which officials said was less than the state had received in the
previous drought program. 3 Over the course of the year-long drought the state
government supplemented this with US$13,406,055 (Campos 1988, 17) and emergency
funding totaled US$61,715,618, the largest sum that any Northeastern state spent on
drought relief that year.4 Although ten states 5 declared emergencies, Ceard utilized as
much as a third of the total amount spent on relief in the entire Northeast that year,
US$195,967,438 (Magalhdes 1991, 67).
Governor Jereissati immediately applied the funding to a one-year drought relief
program, PAPCS (Programa de Ag5es Permanentes de Combate &s Sicas, Program for
1Almost 100% of my respondents, when asked about the significance of Jereissati's
administration, used this word.
2The figures stated are in 1987/1988 dollars. The conversion rate for that period was
US$1=Cz$98.09 (Magalhaes 1991, 67).
3Aithough I do not know the exact amount of money that the Federal Government gave to Ceard
in the drought of 1983, state officials noted that federal funding to Ceari was considerably less in 1987 than
it had been in 1983. This seems plausible, given that combined federal and state funding in 1987
(US$195,967,438)was 45% less than 1983 federal funding (US$351,895,589).
4See Magalhaes (1991) for a complete table with Northeast drought relief funding.
5Minas Gerais, although not a Northeastern state, also received funding because a section of the
state experiences severe drought conditions.
Permanent Actions to Combat the Drought). Apart from providing immediate
humanitarian relief (water, food supplies, and milk to mothers and children), PAPCS, like
past relief programs, created employment and work projects for the newly unemployed.
Of the highest funded Northeast states, Ceard spent the highest proportion of its
emergency aid, 80%, on labor (Magalhies 1991, 67), with two other states, Pernambuco
and Parafba spending 55% and 65% respectively. 6 At the peak of the relief program,
Ceard employed 235,487 people, 7 32% of all rural workers in Ceard (Magalhies 1991),8
and 40% of the families that the authorities had identified as drought victims (Magalhies
1991, 34,65). Although Ceard spent a relatively large portion of its funding on
employment, the level of funding determined that the state could not hire as many people
as it had previously (SEPLAN 1989, 9). Rather than maintain the same number of
workers as in 1983 the state reduced the number of workers so that unlike the previous
administration a) it could afford to index wages according to inflation (Magalhies 1991,
66; SEPLAN 1989, 10)9 and b) it could present employment as a privilege, rather than a
guarantee, inciting workers to perform well.10
The projects that PAPCS funded covered a wide range. Table 1 shows a list of
the projects.
6Worldwide USAID-led Food for Work Programs spend a maximum of 77%, and an average of
52% of total expenditures on labor (Thomas 1986, 26). Employment Guarantee Schemes that focus on
water development projects (well, tanks, irrigation channels) tend to use the highest percentage (80%) of
funding on labor, as opposed to road construction, for example, which spends up to 45% on non-labor costs
(Costa, 1978; D'Silva, 1983).
7Campos (1988, 10) says the state employed 232,039 rural workers.
8Ceard along with Pernambuco, hired the highest proportion of rural workers among the states
with the highest number of rural workers (MagalhAes 1991, 65).
9Brazil has for the past decade experienced a high rate of inflation. Between 1980 and 1990
Brazil had the fourth highest inflation rate in the world (284% per annum), behind Nicaragua, Argentina
and Bolivia (World Bank 1992).
10The reduced level of employment was indicative of the entire Northeast which employed only
one third (1,039,061) the number hired in 1983 (Magalhies 1991, 30, 65).
Table 1.
1987-1988 Projects. (Construction and Maintenance)
Facilities Quantity
*Water Storage
Facilities
Cisterns 8,759
Wells 9,303
Dams and 1,234
River Dams
Total 19,226 units
-Community 6,291 units
Facilities 1 1
*Small Scale
Infrastructure
Irrigation 9,578 meters
canals
(Irrigated area 4,077 hectares)
Community 573 units
Gardens
Land prepared 79,693
for agricultural hectares
production
-Highway and Drain
Maintenance
Gullies/Drains 651 units
River Passage 1 2  11,514 meters
Highways 2,640
kilometers
Source: Department of Planning and Coordination-Department of Special Programs
(Magalhdes 1991, 43)13
Ceard aimed to increase the effectiveness of PAPCS despite the reduced funding.
The state strove to create an institutional framework that would increase accountability
and eliminate the leakage of funds at the local level. The state also decided to direct the
funding towards projects that would serve drought victims in the long run and projects
11124 warehouses, 101 community centers, 58 production houses for cassava, 1,149 housing
structures, 647 toilets, 60 schoolhouse, 18 health posts, 145 agricultural posts (Campos 1988).
12These are small concrete bridges built over small rivers. The design is such that pedestrians and
vehicles can pass over it, but that channels of water can pass through it to prevent flooding.
13Campos (1988, 12,15) reports slightly lower figures for construction and recuperation and
shows where, in April 1988 25% of the projects were still in the process of construction.
that the drought-afflicted population needed most. In this paper, I will show how the
state carried out these intentions.
The Institutional Framework
The Schematic StructurfP PS (Magalhies 1991, 37)
COUNCIL OF SECRETARIES
Chair- Governor Jereissati
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A. Council of Secretaries: This council comprised secretaries from the Departments of Social Action,
Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, Planning and Coordination, Industry and Commerce, Water Works,
Transportation, Energy, Communication and Works, Urban Development and the Environment,
Health, Education, Public Security, Justice and State, the Coordinator for Civil Defense and the
governor. The group represented the state level policy making body for drought relief and set the
guidelines for PAPCS.
B. The Department of Social Program (SAS), and The State Coordinator for Civil Defense (CEDEC):
Coordinator of PAPCS. Centralized the relevant data and conducts exploratory field missions.
CEDEC (formerly GESCAP) falls under SAS having transferred from the Ministry of Agriculture.
SAS "adopted" EMATERCE from the Department of Agriculture, to assist with relief delivery.
C. Department of Planning and Coordination (SEPLAN): In charge of physical and financial planning
and coordination of GAI (described below), the inter institutional body.
D. Group for Inter institutional Articulation (GAI): A group of civil servants and extension agents from
the following state organs:
SAS The Department of Social Programs
SUCAM (Superentendincia de Campanha de Saude Publica, Agency for Public Health Campaigns).
NUTEC (Fundagdo Nucleo de Tecnologia Industrial do Ceard, Agency for Industrial Technology of
Ceard)
State--
Central
and
Regional
Level
The e-hematic trurture of PAM
d
REFSA (Rede Ferrovidria S.A., Railway Service)
COHAB (Companhia de Habitagdo do Estado de Ceard, Cears State Agency for Housing)
AUMEF (Autarquia da Regido Metropolitana de Fortaleza, Center for the Metropolitan Region of
Fortaleza) 14
CEMINAS (Companhia Cearense de MineragVdo, Mining Company of CearA),
DAER (Departamento Aut6nomo de Estradas y Rodagens, Department of Highways and Roadways)
SOHIDRA (Secretaria de Obras Hidricas, Department for Water Resources)
EMATERCE (Empresa de Assistincia Tgcnica e Extensdo Rural do Ceard, Agency for Technical
Assistance and Rural Extension in Ceard).
These agencies provided technical and logistic support for drought relief projects in the communities.
E. Executing Departments: The departments responsible for GAI personnel.
SUCAM
REFSA
Industry and Commerce (CEMINAS and NUTEC)
Urban Development and Environment (COHAB)
Water Resources (SOHIDRA)
Transportation, Energy, Communication and Works (DAER)
Agriculture and Agrarian Reform
Social Action
Health
F. Community Action Group, (GAC): A 12 member temporary organization created exclusively for the
purpose of the 1987-1988 drought. 170 (drought stricken) municipalities formed GACs. The group's
volunteer members represented their various interest groups. The standard GAC comprised:
3 representatives from various communities
1 executive member of the town hall
1 legislative member of the town hall
1 representative from the rural workers union
1 representative from the church
1 representative from the service clubs
1 representative from the landowners union
1 representative from the Department of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform (an EMATERCE worker).
1 representative from the municipal Department of Education
1 representative from the municipal Department of Health
G. Target Population: Drought stricken and for the most part unemployed communities.
The Steps Leading to the Execution of Projects
(Campos 1988, Interviews)
Step 1. The Council of Secretaries outlined the aims of PAPCS and established the
types of projects that workers in the emergency employment scheme would undertake.
The projects followed a general criteria, slightly different from that of past programs:
First, for the most part, the state restricted projects to public land or small private
farms, (under 50 hectares) as opposed to using land belonging to large landowners
(Campos, Khan, and Fraga 1988, 11; Magalhies 1991, 35). In the case of a number of
14This agency is now SEDURB (Superintendencia de Desenvolvimiento Urbana do Estado do
Ceard, Urban Development Agency for the State of Ceard).
brick making projects however, workers used private land. However, unlike past relief
programs in which landowners denied workers access to the projects on private property,
relief administrators arranged to transport the bricks from the private property to where
they were needed (to build houses and community centers) immediately following
production. Owners could not restrict workers' access to the final product. Shifting
permanent projects away from large private land holdings was a major break from
previous programs.
Second, the council favored labor intensive projects only where there were high
concentrations of unemployed workers in the area. One such project was in Canind6, the
Catholic "mecca" for northern Ceard, where the state decided to build a large outdoor
religious amphitheater to seat hundreds of people. It was one of the few large scale
projects in the program, but the type that the region needed since many people had
already migrated to the sede of Canind6 by the time PAPCS began.
Third, the state chose not to undertake projects that forced workers to travel long
distances. For one of the farmers I spoke to in Taud this represented the most significant
difference between the drought relief program of 1979-1983 and that of 1987 as living
away from home had been the most burdensome aspect of past relief programs.
Fourth, the state also encouraged people to select smaller projects, such as small
wells and community buildings, that related closely to the needs of their own
communities rather than the needs of large landowners and politicians. One worker noted
that this was such a dramatic shift from other relief programs, that when he joined a brick
making team of workers, he did so just assuming that the bricks were going to be used by
a large landowner or sent to Fortaleza. It came as a shock to him to realize that the bricks
were going to be used by other workers in the community to build a multi-purpose
community center which would house a creche and community activities.
Finally, PAPCS wanted residents in drought prone areas to benefit from projects
in the long run. The government encouraged small farmers to prepare their own land
rather than that of large landowners, for the planting season. A very active rural workers
union leader said that although the time that the government paid farmers to work in their
own fields could have been longer, this innovation was one of the best features of the
program. Due to this innovation, he noted, the following harvest produced better results
than he had seen in the past ten years.
Step 2. CEDEC, with assistance from EMATERCE, and FUNCEME (Fundagdo
Cearense de Metereologia, The Meteorological Agency of Ceard), used meteorological
data and information from the field to select the most drought-stricken municipios. They
selected 94%, or 171 municipios in the state (Magalhqes 1991, 69).15
Step 3. Mayors in the selected municipios estimated the number of severely affected
families and passed the information on to the Council of Secretaries in Fortaleza. They
did this with the assistance of EMATERCE.
Step 4. The Council of Secretaries weighed municipios against others statewide and
estimated the maximum number of beneficiaries that each municipio could select.
Step 5. At the same time, at the community level, drought stricken communities (the
target population), some with as few as five families and others with as many as 200,
assembled to select the neediest families amongst themselves to receive employment by
the state. They went down the list of families, discussed each case and voted for each one
with a show of hands. They based their selection on the criteria set by the state. The
criteria were that the hardest hit agricultural families could receive work and a maximum
of one person per household (generally the male head of the household) could be
employed. The communities also selected the projects (for example cisterns, wells,
brick-making, small gardens) on which they wanted the people employed by the program
15Seven of these municpios only had small projects led by SUCAM.
to work. The ways in which community participation affected the outcome of PAPCS are
explained in the following chapter.
Step 6. The GACs, the municipal committees which oversaw drought relief delivery in
communities across the municipio, registered the names of the families selected by the
communities, according to the limit and criteria set by the Council of Secretaries. They
weighed the communities against other communities, short-listed the workers to
correspond with the number set by the state, and streamlined the list of project demands
before passing information on to CEDEC/SAS and the Executing Departments.
Sometimes the GACs restricted employment in a given community to as little as 20%;
sometimes it was as much as 100%. Because the GACs formed such a crucial component
of PAPCS I will devote a later chapter to a discussion of these groups.
Step 7. The Executing Departments analyzed the selection of projects with CEDEC,
weighing them against the general aims of the program.
Step 8. The Council of Secretaries examined and approved the list of projects.
Step 9. The Executing Department assigned the approved projects and communities to
various agencies and field agents. As the following table shows, EMATERCE managed
the widest range of projects. The influence of EMATERCE on PAPCS is outlined in a
later chapter.
Table 2
DeDartments/Aeencies that managed the projects in PAPCS
EXECUTING TYPE OF NUMBER OF NUMBER OF % OF TOTAL
STATE AGENCY PROJECT MUNICIPIOS PERSONS WORKERS
UNDERTAKEN THAT EACH EMPLOYED BY EMPLOYED
BY AGENCY AGENCY EACH AGENCY
WORKED IN
Dep't of. Social Community 19 337 0.2
Programs Buildings
SUCAM Pest Control 80 998 0.4
NUTEC Water Sources 8 1,015 0.4
(Small wells etc.)
REFSA Railway 17 1,366 0.6
improvement
COHAB, AUMEF Sewerage, 21 1,379 0.6
Housing, Paving
SOHIDRA Dams, Irrigation, 33 4,413 1.9
Water Source
Dep't of. Health Health Agents 127 6,350 2.7
CEMINAS Whitewash, 129 39,910 17.2
Masonry,
Brickwork,
Mineral Extraction,
Community
Buildings
DAER Road Improvement 148 74,504 32.1
Water Sources
EMATERCE Agriculture Posts, 158 101,767 43.9
Irrigation,
Vegetable
Gardens, Plowing,
Small River Dams,
Other Dams,
Storage Facilities,
I Schools, Wells I
Total 1232,039 100
Source: Department of Social Programs 1988
Over 90% of all employment generated by these programs were in the
infrastructure or physical improvement projects. However, in addition to infrastructure
projects, the state also implemented service provision components (although these will
not be discussed in depth in this paper). For example, a health agent program in which
the Department of Health trained over 6,000 community women to be health agents
completing over 1 million house calls over the period. 16 SUCAM (a public health
16See Freedheim (1993) for a description of this program.
agency) also trained 1000 people to perform pest control services involving building-to-
building inspection for disease-carrying insects. The workers made almost half a million
visits during the emergency. 17
Step 10. Once in the communities, field agents (GAI) noted the names of the workers for
each project and undertook the role of managing them. Agents managed workers in
various communities who were doing the same type of project or managed single
communities doing several types of projects. This depended on the agency's range of
expertise.
The number of people that the program employed varied monthly (as shown in the
following table). The program gradually phased in workers starting in June 1987 until
employment reached its peak in February 1988, and gradually phased them out starting in
March when they returned to their fields to prepare for the following season (the humid
months begin with January). 18
Table 3
Monthly employment of workers
Month Total # of Workers % Change
June 1987 45,652 -
July 70,447 54
August 129,734 84
September 147,415 14
October 154,922 5
November 187,338 21
December 210,181 12
January 1988 224,410 7
February 232,039 3
March 230,428 -0.01
Source: Department of Social Programs 1988
17Each building in Cearg, both rural and urban has to be inspected by a SUCAM agent and must
be able to show proof of inspection.18See SEPLAN (1989) for details of the phase out process.
The field agents paid workers one minimum wage, often with a member of the
GAC present to supervise the payment (Campos 1988, 84), and workers signed a receipt.
Although the state indexed the wages to inflation (Magalhies 1991, 66) some workers
said that they received less than a minimum wage for their work because the adjustment
of wages lagged behind inflation. The program paid workers for 6 weeks following
project discontinuation to ensure that they had some income to take them into the
planting season, during which time they would not yet receive income from agricultural
production. For the first two weeks after their release the state paid 75% of workers'
normal pay; the second two weeks, 50%; and the last two weeks 25% (SEPLAN 1989,
44-45).
Commenting on the effects of drought relief, a past secretary of a state department
noted,
Immediately before the (relief) program started making its first (employment) payments
in 1987 I traveled throughout the interior. It was like a ghost town. I traveled for
kilometers without seeing another car, there were no vehicles on the highway. In the
municpios there was very little activity.
However, two months later (after the relief program was underway) when I traveled to
the same area there was a lot of activity and more vehicles on the roads and highways. People
were buying things and building. People were using materials (bricks, tiles) being made (under
the relief employment program) in the municipios. The resurgence of economic activity was in
response to the arrival of relief.
Relief Administration Backed by a Change in Approach
A major difference between the 1987 program and the prior effort was that the
Department of Social Programs made a concerted effort to maintain contact with the
interior throughout the program's tenure. At the start of his tenure at the Department of
Social Programs and as the director of PAPCS, the new secretary, Dr. Jos6 Rosa Abreu
Vale, made it a point to travel extensively throughout the interior, a habit that he
maintained throughout the entire drought period. Rural residents with whom I spoke said
that it was unusual for the senior state government officials involved in drought relief to
make such visits, and that they had seldom seen or heard of Secretaries of State traveling
to the interior on official business and showing as much interest in drought relief
efforts. 19
The secretary also arranged for the GAI workers who had been assigned to work
in the field with PAPCS, to take a statewide bus trip to expose them to the interior--a first
time trip for many of them. A mid-level civil servant from the Department of Planning
who went on the trip said that she had been very enthusiastic about the prospect of
traveling to the interior since she had never been there, and that many fellow GAI
workers had only heard about the drought in the interior before traveling there, even
though one only needs to travel three hours away from the city to see the devastating
effects of the drought. After the trip, members of GAI understood the context of the
interior which enhanced their ability to assign projects and work in the interior.
PAPCS centralized information under SAS
The Department of Social Programs (SAS) became a vital forum at the helm of
relief delivery, a forum under which PAPCS centralized and encouraged the exchange of
information and expertise coming from as many as ten various agencies and departments
(previously listed). The fact that various departments and agencies came together made it
easier for the state to quickly obtain basic facts and comparative data needed to get the
program off the ground.
Consolidating efforts at the top between the Secretary of the Department of
Planning and the Secretary of the Department of Social Programs had another strategic
impact. Both secretaries had worked in Brazil's federal capital prior to taking office and
had first hand knowledge of how things were run at the federal level. Therefore when the
state needed assistance beyond the boundaries of the formal drought assistance, they were
able to make use of their contacts to expedite decisions in Brasilia. For example, utilizing
professional contacts that he had made in Brasilia, the secretary of SAS was able to
19There is a certain amount of irony in this since the secretary had spent most of his teenage and
adult life overseas and in Brazil's capital, Brasilia, before returning to CearA right before the drought. In a
way he was an "outsider" to Ceard, and more so to its interior.
encourage agencies in Brasilia to fund the delivery of free milk in Ceard during the
drought period, a unique and rare feature of drought relief. Initially federal agencies
donated milk for one month, but the secretary got the contribution extended to six
months. The milk delivery arrangement contributed greatly to the decline of infant
mortality in the state during the drought.
PAPCS gave new roles to municipal and community players
Ironically, although centralizing information about field conditions in Ceard was
one of the strong points of PAPCS, the institutional innovation of decentralizing
supervisory roles and some decision-making to the municipal and community level
probably made the greatest difference to drought relief delivery. Because the state had
groups in the field monitoring the program and field agents dispersed throughout the
state, the Department of Social Programs heard of, and responded to problems and
requests in less than two weeks, a considerably shorter turn around period than in
previous drought programs.20
Because PAPCS gave new responsibilities to municipal leaders and drought
victims, there was a reduction of corruption and manipulation of the program at the
municipal level. This is interesting because one might think that relegating supervisory
roles to municipios and communities would actually increase the likelihood of corruption
or result in problems previously experienced in which elites skimmed relief funds. The
following chapters will focus on three new or enhanced roles of the community, the
municipal committees (GACs), and EMATERCE, and how these groups managed the
program and withstood corruption.
20From an interview with several GAC members from the hardest hit region.
CHAPTER FOUR
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION: GIVING VICTIMS A SAY.
The innovations of the 1987-1988 drought relief program included the
participation of drought victims in one of the key decision-making stages of the program.
Once PAPCS had set its general guidelines, it allowed drought communities to decide
which projects they would carry out under the relief program and which workers the state
would hire for its emergency employment scheme. PAPCS did so in spite of the fact that
the drought affected as many as 600,000 families across a state that is seven times as
large as Massachusetts, and that the selection of workers had to be narrowed to only
235,000 positions (Magalhies 1991, 34, 65). It also did so in spite of the fact that the
program's success relied on communities' ability to make decisions quickly so that field
agents could gather and feed information to the state in order to mobilized the program in
the interior.
Although many critics of participatory programs fear that large-scale
participation has the tendency to compromise the effectiveness and timeliness of projects,
victim participation in this case increased rural residents' responsibility toward the
program, increased the appropriateness of projects, created natural checks and balances
for the program and satisfied more residents. Furthermore, victim participation did not
compromise the timely delivery of relief. By allowing victims to participate, the
government also raised the credibility of the program, and reduced the propensity for
riots, migration and starvation.
PAPCS felt the benefits of community participation were so important that they
made community-based decision making a part of their formal guidelines despite the risk
of being slow. How did the state manage to provide quality relief while pursuing a
"socially correct" yet time consuming tool such as participation? What is it about the
manner in which victims were allowed to participate that made relief useful? Also, what
incentives were there for victims to gather as communities to vote on likely recipients,
given that sometimes as little as one tenth of a given community could receive assistance
and employment because of limited funding?
Why Did the Participatory Method Work in PAPCS?
One of the central explanations is that rural residents perceived that state leaders
in Ceard were truly committed to increasing the level of involvement of everyday citizens
into its development plans.
The literature often assumes that the poor naturally welcome development
strategies which allow them to participate in decision making. However, Graham (1991)
describes a situation in post authoritarian Chile where people emerging from a state of
repression did not welcome the notion of public and institutionalized participation
because "many actors (were) participating for the first time" and were still "particularly
vulnerable to partisan manipulation." It is not uncommon for the poor to fear or mistrust
a post-authoritarian government's encouragement of popular organizations. Therefore, it
was important for Ceard's government to convince people that their participation would
produce better results, and then to facilitate it. Respondents say that in the 1987 drought
relief program, the government used the media and EMATERCE agents to convince the
skeptics that rural residents would have an authentic say in the way relief was provided.
In his "Plans for Change" document, Governor Jereissati wrote that "the
participation of the society, especially groups benefiting from government actions, would
be promoted and respected as an essential element for the feasibility of social objectives
(Ceard 1987, 9)." This commitment mirrored that of several key players in PAPCS. For
example, the Secretary of the Department of Social Programs, who did comprehensive
reading and analysis of past relief programs. 1 The fact that state officials displayed this
1The Secretary had previously worked in many social welfare programs and his experience also
fed into his professional approach towards PAPCS.
commitment by formally including communities in the delivery process enabled the state
to convince people to participate.
There are several other possible factors which led the participatory technique to be
functional in Ceard.
The state capitalized on a growing trend
The government of Ceard, through its decision to involve the communities
cleverly capitalized on and fostered a movement which was already growing. At the time
of the 1987 drought, popular organizations and resident associations had already begun to
surface all over the country, each feeding on the reputation of others. 2 Once-clandestine
organizations were going public, often with the support of the church and the increasingly
powerful unions. In addition, through PAPP (The Support Program for Small Farmers
implemented prior to the 1987 drought) people had become more familiar with the notion
of publicly organizing behind demands. Many people across the state were frustrated
with the old way of doing things, frustrated with getting relief only in exchange for votes,
and were looking towards alternate solutions. Respondents state that people were weary
of being mere beneficiaries and wanted to influence decisions that the state government
made.
By incorporating this participatory component the state drew upon, and indirectly
endorsed a current trend that enhanced the drought relief program.
The state imposed limits that made participation less "messy."
Participation worked well and in a timely fashion because the state set limits on
the decisions to be made by the communities. In essence, the government was careful to
qualify what "participation" meant.3 The government clearly stated the stage at which
the community could make its input, (after the state established its general guidelines),
2Like that of Vila Centenaria, in the urban periphery of Iguatu. The residents association of Vila
Centenaria first met in 1981 having heard about successful "underground" residents associations in Sao
Paulo. Even prior to democratization in 1986, they had begun making demands for small scale
infrastructure to the mayor. Some demands had been met, while at other times the police had intervened
and physically blocked them from the town hall, where they would make their demands.
3See Tendler (1982a) who explains the various interpretations of "participation."
and the extent of community input. Although the broader aims of the program limited the
potential for powerful landowners and elites to undermine the relief program, the
program guidelines were more specific (no projects on private property, small projects,
etc.). This reduced the propensity for confusion and misinterpretation at the community
level when it came to making decisions.
Several critics however, argued that the project options that the government
presented were not necessarily options that communities wanted. For example, many
farmers wanted to work on large-scale irrigation systems which would address some of
the long term effects of the drought on agriculture, which the government did not make
an option, rather than small-scale projects. Also, many insisted on projects that would
take longer than the time of the drought to complete and projects that hired farmers for a
longer period. The state however, elected to target projects that farmers were likely to
complete within the drought period in order to avoid having to pay farmers over an
extended period and to avoid wasting resources on unfinished projects. Essentially
people participated, not necessarily by selecting what they viewed as the best projects for
drought alleviation, but rather by selecting the best projects out of a number of options
that the state determined previously.
Affiliates of the unions, the Workers Party and some members of the church
opposed the "minimalist" participation program on the grounds that while the
participatory component of PAPCS was good, the program did not promote "genuine"
decision-making given that a) the state had the ultimate say on how many people would
receive employment based on their budget rather on the actual demand, b) the state
determined the criteria that communities used to select people for employment and c) the
state did not allow communities to select any project, but rather allowed them to choose
projects from within a prescribed set of options.
Some Fortaleza-based, university trained social workers and social scientists
agreed, arguing that by establishing limits to participation, the state was actually retaining
much of the decision-making control and not allowing participation which would then
lead to the program's improvement. For rural participation to be authentic, it had to be
100% rural and the initiative had to come from within the rural areas. They felt that the
government grounded its program on the myth that rural and less educated residents were
incapable of making decisions and creating their own criteria for the program. 4 They
scoffed at the argument that the program allowed effective participation.
In response I would argue that the state succeeded in delivery, particularly with
regard to speed, precisely because it laid out specific limits and carefully defined
participation. By placing a limit on the types of demands, the Department of Social
Programs simplified mass participation and helped to maintain the focus of PAPCS.
Statewide uniformity in the guidelines and criteria (that is, the state did not customize the
limits and criteria to the demands of each community) narrowed down the potential types
of requests that went from communities to the municipio and then to the state. Therefore,
the secretary and other officials in the SAS found it easier to respond to problems coming
from the field in a timely fashion. A state representative noted that municipios received
responses to demands within 10-21 days of appealing to the state for help as opposed to
the month that they sometimes had to wait in previous droughts.
With the limits that the state set, participation was transformed from a tedious,
time-consuming process to a functional and highly effective tool for relief delivery.
Furthermore it led victims to treat their role in the relief process more seriously, and
thereby enhance overall supervision.
4Ugalde (1985) says that many externally created participatory programs are founded on the
misconception that a) traditional values hold people back and b) traditional or rural people are not capable
of organizing themselves.
How Did Participation Enhance Supervision?
Involvement of victims in decision-making created a sense of responsibility
Participation worked well because it transformed people's roles from merely
laborers and recipients of state largess, to active decision-makers who were partially
responsible for the results of the program. In Taud, for example, when the government
announced the drought relief program, many drought victims who had already migrated
to the urban centers in search of food and water returned to their rural homes immediately
to register for the program and to take part in meetings, "with their once-empty bellies
filled with anticipation."5 Respondents stated that the government's display of interest
and the expected benefits of employment, food, and water were part of what encouraged
them to return home.
Limited jobs lead to greater program vigilance
According to an official in the Department of Social Programs, SAS intentionally
announced that the state could not employ everyone. The secretary of SAS went so far as
to understate the actual number of jobs allocated for a municipio in order to reinforce the
idea of limited resources. By limiting the numbers, while at the same time ensuring a
reasonable number of jobs, he hoped that the people would prioritize and select only
those with true need. He expected two other benefits: first that people who managed to
receive jobs would then have pride in them and take their jobs very seriously; second that
those who didn't receive employment would become de-facto monitors and ensure that
people who obtained jobs would perform well. This seemed to have worked because in
several areas when someone wasn't showing up to work people in the community
reported the person to the responsible field agents. 6 By stating falsely low numbers, the
5Interview with a lay worker from the church in Taud, August 1992.
6Health officials have applied the same strategy to the selection of health care workers in the state
(Freedheim 1993). Only a small percentage of people applying for health agent positions in some
communities actually receive employment, but state employers tell those who are not hired that they can
replace agents who do not perform well. Because this kind of check is in place, agents are forced to
perform better.
secretary left some leeway for communities in dire situations who took the initiative to
make special requests to the government for additional help.
Portraying employment opportunities as a "privilege" led to self and group
monitoring. Thus inefficiencies like absenteeism and lethargy on the job, which had been
associated with the previous employment programs, were drastically reduced.
Group participation created resistance to outside manipulation
Group decision-making helped to circumvent the manipulation that had taken
place in previous relief programs. As a group they vocally expressed that they would not
tolerate manipulation by local councilpersons, and subsequently applied social pressure
within the group to vote responsibly. Applying social pressure worked since members,
for the most part, were homogenous, possessing similar backgrounds, experiencing
similar circumstances, and wanting the same results from the program. That is, the group
did not include elite farmers who were capable of influencing poor farmers who were
dependent upon them for financial support.
Undoubtedly there were some individuals who were reluctant to give up the
benefits that they personally received from the manipulation of past relief programs. As
one respondent said, "Remember that manipulation goes two ways. It's true that we
might be forced to vote for politicians that we don't really like in order to receive basic
amenities from politicians and landowners. But they also depend on us to keep them in
power. We get them to do things for us in return for our support." However, most people
told me that they preferred situations in which they didn't constantly have to enter into
individual agreements with elites in order to meet their basic needs,7 and that they voted
accordingly.
7A proposed solution for clientelistic municipios in Brazil, has been to promote mayors'
interaction with organizations rather than with individuals (Ferguson 1990, 17) and therefore encourage
group demand-making.
Participation Led People to Make Further Demands on the Program, Which Led to
Minor Yet Crucial Adjustments.
Once the program got underway, groups highlighted the program's weaknesses
and started to make "customized" demands on the program. Although the program could
not respond to all the requests, it did when the groups making the demands proved to the
state that the demands were easy to facilitate and still within the guidelines of the
program. For example, after the program had barely begun, a group of 500 women in
Taud who felt discriminated against by PAPCS, invaded the GAC meeting in the sede
where the Secretary of the Department of Social Programs was present. In a letter which
they presented to the Secretary, they demanded work for women, arguing that the
program did not have any suitable or sufficient jobs for women except for tending small
gardens, brick making and the health agent program, projects which usually hired fewer
workers. Although there was resistance from the GAC leader who viewed their invasion
as the disruption of an orderly process, the Department of Social Programs authorized the
creation of an artisan center8 which they had requested. Construction began in
December, and in March PAPCS hired 65 women to do crochet, embroidery and
dressmaking. The department funded the purchase of primary materials and machines
and labor for four months.9 Although the project differed from the standard projects, it
still fell within the specific guidelines of PAPCS.
The leaders of the women's group which had the active support of the rural
workers' union and the church became more vocal with the introduction of the
community participation. One of the leaders of the demonstration said that were it not for
the government's new approach toward the community, the women would probably not
have done anything. Thus community participation had additional benefits. People went
beyond government-sanctioned participation and got involved in making suggestions and
8As an example of the inter relatedness of projects, the center was built using bricks, tiles and
male labor from the employment program.
9The artisan center was registered as a business and still operates.
taking the initiative to ask for improvements. The program fostered an internal process
which identified shortcomings of the program at no additional costs.
To summarize, in the drought program of 1987-1988 the Government of Ceard
allowed drought victims in rural communities to become involved. By encouraging this
level of involvement in the municipios while ensuring that participation was well defined,
the state implemented more appropriate projects, provided employment for the neediest
victims, and delivered relief in a timely manner. The innovation further led communities
to take a more active role in monitoring relief delivery.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE GACS: MUNICIPAL "OVERSEERS" OF RELIEF.
The GACs were 12-member municipal administrative committees1 that the
Departments of Social Programs and Planning created in most of the 171 municipios
included in PAPCS 2 to oversee relief delivery taking place in the drought stricken
communities surrounding the sedes. Each GAC usually met once a week during the
beginning of the drought and twice weekly during the peak of the drought to evaluate
information coming from the communities. In creating this municipal administrative
body, "The state," as a past state secretary said, "recognized the value of the municipio as
a space for articulating responses to the drought."
How Did the GACs Help PAPCS?
The GACs helped implementation in four ways as I elaborate below: i) They
streamlined all information ii) They served a trouble-shooting role, and iii) They
provided a means by which the program could bypass potentially corrupt mayors
GACs streamlined information
The GACs streamlined all the requests, data and information about the
employment scheme and the projects and forwarded these to the Department of Social
Programs. At the very outset of the program in June 1987, they summarized the
condition of the various municipios and estimated the number of victims they felt the
state should hire in each community and the range of projects that would suit victims'
needs. With their comprehensive view of the municipio, they voted on which
communities would benefit from particular projects, using the information passed on to
them from the communities. Rather than having to wade through raw information
1See chapter three for the composition of the group.
2Some municipios did not employ enough people to merit the presence a GAC.
coming from thousands of communities across the state, the Department of Social
Programs could then rely on the GACs to analyze and forward the crucial information
and to handle the issues that could be dealt with locally.
During this drought period, field agents and GAC coordinators got to know the
Secretary of SAS personally and established a rapport with him which further enhanced
communication between the municipio and Fortaleza. Testimony of this relationship
came years later when the ex-Secretary returned to some of the municipios to talk with
GAC coordinators about the program. The coordinators were still eager to meet and
discuss their impressions of the experience, of what they thought were the negative and
positive experiences and what could be done to improve the system. They were also
eager to work with the ex-Secretary on designing future drought relief programs and to
sustain the dialogue that had emerged under PAPCS. While the state decentralized some
of the responsibility to new municipal players, it also fostered a feedback process that
made the program more effective.
GACs identified problems soon after they surfaced
In sharp contrast to pre-1987 drought relief programs in which there had been no
effective method of detecting and reporting municipal corruption SAS implemented the
GACs to identify problems as soon as they arose. SAS did so in order to address
problems before they became so critical that drought victims either rioted, traveled to the
Department of Social Program to protest (administratively cumbersome) 3 or resorted to
migration.
The GACs detected cases of corruption quickly because they lived and operated at
the site of relief delivery and among both the actors who would receive relief, and those
who were capable of misappropriating relief. For example, local politicians in a
particular municipio invited the local GAC coordinator (an EMATERCE agent) to one of
their party meetings knowing that he supported their party. The meeting turned out to be
31t is not uncommon for groups or community representatives from the interior to travel to the
Department of Social Programs during drought periods to ask for food and other basic items.
a session in which they tried to get the coordinator to divert relief funds to the
construction of a small dam on the property of one of the elite members of the party. The
GAC coordinator refused to comply and reported the incident to the state. The state
immediately sent word to the politicians making it clear that the state would not tolerate
that sort of corruption.
GACs were more suited to making certain decisions than Fortaleza-based civil
servants because coordinators in Fortaleza were not as well informed about what was
taking place at the municipal level. For example, whereas in previous droughts municipal
landowners could convince state officials to build unwarranted facilities on their
properties the GACs were able to recognize where these requests were inappropriate and
veto them.
The GACs became a local "thermostat," recognizing, drawing attention and
reacting to potentially disruptive situations.
GACs minimized the role of mayors--somewhat of an asset
The Secretaries in charge of PAPCS were keen on avoiding the active
involvement of mayors, who in the past had often controlled and diverted relief funding, 4
particularly around election time. A post-1987 document analyzes the problem:
Occasionally (in 1987) delegating some of the powers to Prefectures of municipal governments
(prefeito) would turn out to be a mistake: local political leaders would promptly take advantage of
the situation, subverting the criteria of selection of projects and enlisted for their own benefit; in
addition, some Prefectures thought the occasion was ripe for an attempt to regain control of the
Program (SEPLAN 1989, 35).
Another example of mayors abusing political power comes from a municipio in
which the program had difficulties when it came to selecting workers for the health agent
program in 1987. The mayor in one municipio (exemplary of others) insisted on selecting
4Tendler (1991) notes that POLONORDESTE (a Federal Government/World Bank program
which funded rural integrated development in the nine Northeast states starting in 1974) also did not give
municipal governments formal roles in projects since the program's administrators viewed them as having
clientelistic tendencies.
all the health workers himself rather than going through the standard procedure of
resident selection. The agents he chose were people he knew and political supporters. 5
The GAC innovation tried to get around problems like these by practically
eliminating the active role of the mayor and the town hall. That is, although the GACs
allowed the mayor to attend meetings, the funds for relief which were scrutinized by the
GACs did not go through the mayor but via state civil servants like EMATERCE.
Mayors criticized the obvious detour to the extent that the discussion reached one of the
state's major newspapers, 0 Povo (1992). The mayors argued for greater involvement of
the (municipal) Town Hall, which they said would facilitate relief administration and
reduce the delays in the program that they claimed were the fault of centralized relief
administration. The mayors argued for more autonomy in local governments, for the
government to give them the role of administering the drought relief program at the
municipal level, and for additional municipal decision-making power.
Yet, the GAC innovation proved itself a successful innovation, particularly in the
municipios such as Iguatu, where drought relief delivery was successful despite the
presence of mayors renown for corruption. This finding is important particularly since
many development projects try to find a way of working around poorly performing
mayors and fragile political structures. Their challenge is to devise programs which do
not succumb to weak administrators and are immune to the ebb and flow of local politics.
Forming the GACs was one solution to this frequently cited problem.
The GACs made information public
The GACs often relayed information to the community over the radio such as
information from the state concerning the statewide progress of the relief program, the
progress of various projects, and project starting dates to residents in the municipio and
decisions made at the GAC meetings--to ensure transparincia, or administrative
openness, in order to reduce corruption. In the case of Taud, independent reporters from
5See Freedheim (1993).
the radio would also attend meetings and report the key results and information over the
air. While some members of the GAC were uncomfortable with this, they did not
actively oppose this practice.
In Taud, the GAC also produced monthly information bulletins highlighting the
progress of the program in the municipio. The first, printed in August 1987, introduced
itself in this way: "This bulletin, coming out of the GAC in Taud, attempts to broadcast
news and transactions taking place in Taud and serves as a vehicle for conveying
information concerning the emergency projects." Several news items transmitted through
this medium follow:
"To date the GACs have registered 3,110 people"
"CEMINAS has managed the production of 193,930 bricks and 36,967 roofing tiles.
There are now 22 groups working on this."
"A piece of land is being sought from LBA (a government agency) which is
administrated by the Lions Club, for the erection of a herb garden, which will involve six
to ten women, with the aim of starting a micro-enterprise for herb production."
"We are currently distributing 2400 liters of milk to needy families in the sede daily, with
assistance from the Women's Union, the Residents Association, the Methodist Church,
the Masons (Service Club) and the Lions Club of Taud"
"There are currently 15 young people being trained to combat the mosquito AEDES
DEGYPI and the chagas disease (a fatal insect-carrying disease). House to house
visitations are set to begin in the following locations..."
"Attention: The figures (numbers of workers etc.) presented here are not static. They
change each month and the GAC in Taua is doing everything to ensure that these figures
keep increasing."
(Sherlock 1987-1988)
The bulletins averaged 10 pages, and stated that the GACs were circulating them
to 40 agencies in Taud (community groups, churches, state agencies, unions, the radio
stations, political groups) and to 16 in Fortaleza (including the state newspapers, radio,
the governor and various state organs).6
6Taud was unique in this regard however. The fact that the GAC leader who initiated the bulletin,
unlike many other GAC leaders, preserved all records, meeting minutes, resident registration forms and
bulletins, years after the 1987-88 relief program and even wrote critiques and memoirs of the program,
speaks to his peculiar dedication to the program. The GAC leader was known by his peers as somewhat of
an eccentric, yet, the commitment demonstrated by this leader led the program to be successful there and
led the Secretary of the Department of Social Programs to cite TauA's GAC as exceptional.
Encouraging the free flow of information served to demystify the drought relief
process, the details of which had previously been obscured by the municipal-level elites
who controlled the program. As an administrative and overseeing group, the GACs for
the most part, managed to keep transactions open and steered the program away from
corrupt politicians, landowners and other elites.
What was it about this group that allowed it to carry out these four tasks
effectively and how was it unique? These questions will be answered through an analysis
of the group's characteristics.
Varied Interests Maintained Groups' Balance
Members of the GACs said that at the outset of the program they thought that the
fact that its members came from very different backgrounds and had different interests at
stake would pose the greatest difficulty. GAC members represented a wide range of
interests including private and public, elite and lower income, political and non-partisan
(the church, service clubs, large landowners, small farmers). They were split along
several lines. Some were concerned primarily with the nutritional well-being of drought
victims. Others were interested in the employment status of victims. Some wanted to
ensure that workers were productive in their communities rather than idle in the sede.
Others focused on the long-term well-being of the rural residents. Finally, some were
interested in the projects that would come out of the employment scheme. Such a group,
members felt, would have difficulty reconciling these interests.
Ironically, this mixture of interests actually contributed to the group's ability to
make decisions primarily in the interest of drought victims. The simple majority vote
rule in decision-making, and the balance of the group, prevented any one interest group
from consistently dominating the decisions.
In Iguatu in June 1992, in order to support the research for this thesis, the
coordinator of the now-extinct GAC convened a meeting of some past GAC members to
retrace the events of 1987-1988--a member of the large landowners union, a councilman,
an EMATERCE agent and a rural union leader. The dynamics of the group, confirmed
that strikingly different opinions came from all representatives. 7 In particular, there was
one member who spoke contrary to everyone on each point and was obviously the least
liked or respected in the group. 8 When I asked how that dynamic played itself out in
decisions (particularly since they told me that there were other members who sometimes
voted with this person), everyone shrugged their shoulders and said, "the majority won, in
spite of how the minority felt." They said that because the group represented various
interests, they couldn't afford to allow certain people to make all the decisions
consistently. Having a variety of interests represented on the committee helped to get
around this.
In some municipios, the composition and number of members in the GACs
changed to suit the needs of the group. In the case of the municipio Crateus, for example,
the community representatives felt that their representation was inadequate compared to
that of the state representatives and elites. To repair this inequity, they requested that the
GAC increase the representation of communities to seven out of 16, up from three out of
12. Community/lower income representation, including the rural workers union and
church, ended up being the majority. The Department of Social Programs, impressed by
the level of initiatives that community representatives took, sanctioned the change.
Another example of a change in the GAC composition comes from Taud. The
official representative from the rural labor union, and later from the church, left the GAC
early in the program because some of their of demands were not being met by PAPCS.
They argued for the program to hire more workers, to hire more than one member per
family, and for workers to receive higher wages. Members of the union and church
7For example, in a discussion about the state, the most elite member argued that CearA should
become an independent state, rather than suffer the reputation of being the poorest state in Brazil.
Meanwhile, a less wealthy member of the group argued that the state had to maintain its ties with other
cities and the state in Brazil to which many Cearenses had migrated. Two different opinions, stemming
from two different life circumstances.
8Some members confirmed this in subsequent conversations.
continued to attend, but the official GAC workers union representative was replaced by a
representative from a service organization. The fact that key members of the group left
when their demands were not being met (initially) put a damper on the success of the
GAC in Taud. However, the group continued to be successful, in spite of the adjustments
because members felt that the aim of the group and program were still being met.
What was important for this municipal administrative group, then, was its
heterogeneity. Although this seems to contrast with one of the factors behind effective
community level decision making (homogeneity), for a group operating at this particular
level, where they had to account for the interests of many diverse small groups,
heterogeneity allowed the group to factor the wide range of interests from across the
entire municipio into its deliberations.
Although it seemed ironic that elites (the cause for many past problems) would be
included in the GACs, the drought relief program in Ceard may have actually worked
better because the state government included members of local service clubs, lawyers,
doctors and large landowners. Rather than isolate them from the process or make major
policy changes that openly excluded the elites, the state government incorporated them in
the management of drought relief, just as it did the victims.9
Findings regarding this inclusion are as follows:
First, as part of the GACs, the elites were under constant public scrutiny as the
groups received much media coverage locally and, sometimes nationally. In addition,
there was a certain amount of prestige attached to the committee since it represented a
crucial institution during the drought. In order to maintain their reputation, members
needed to work in the public's interest, going along with the decisions that favored the
majority of local residents. 10
9Marshall (1982) argues that governments can simply adjust the roles of relevant players when
seeking to bring about redistribution aims. Involving elites was a simple means of fulfilling the aims of the
program without resorting to revamping the entire system.
10See Tendler (1991) for cases in which external pressure leads to good performance in agencies,
projects, governments etc.
Second, potential elite demands were tempered. They had to meet and work with
representatives from lower income groups and other interest groups and could not control
decision-making or attempt to manipulate the relief delivery process. 11 For example,
when elites in the municipios tried to get their preferred projects selected (for example a
private well) by influencing elite friends in the GACs, the group usually vetoed the
request.
Third, barring the inclusion of powerful landowners and politicians from the
process could have undermined the relief effort. Initially powerful elites spoke out
against the concept of representative committees to oversee the relief process. However,
once elites who were members of the GAC began to let others know that the GACs
presented a "fair" arena and that not one that actively sought to demolish the dominant
elites, they convinced their peers that the GACs were a good idea which shouldn't be
undermined. Tendler (1982b) has found that sometimes when elites are excluded from
development projects, the projects fail simply because the elites have control over many
of the mechanisms that support the very project.
As the last point illustrates it is better to find out, as Tendler suggests, where the
interests of the elites and the poor overlap and use this as a tool to enhance poverty
alleviating projects. Although they did not suffer from poor nutrition and were not forced
to migrate, elites in the GAC went along with the program because the drought was also
of concern to elites and middle class residents. For elites living in the municipal sede, the
drought meant that the poor would migrate to the city, live on their streets, loiter by their
stores and business places and become a local menace. 12 For bank managers, the drought
meant that the poor would close their bank accounts because of greatly reduced income. 13
11Tendler (1982b) says that giving elites marginal roles in development projects, while creating
the impression that their roles are crucial, can enhance the result of development projects.
12Gathered from several interviews with merchants and businessmen in TauA.
13The bank manager with whom I spoke noted that the complaints of farmers regarding poor
rainfall and crops coincided with an increase in the number of people arriving at the bank to close their
bank accounts.
In sum, the elites had incentive to ensure that the drought relief program worked
well, and the GACs benefited from the inclusion of elites.
GACs--Temporary or Permanent?
The state government disbanded PAPCS and the GACs in 1988 at the end of the
drought. Some of the GAC coordinators argue that the GACs should have continued on a
permanent basis. If the government were to make the GACs a permanent institution, they
would ease the chronic drought problem by having in place an organization to monitor
funding going to municipios for general development programs (which were said to be
ineffective due to the same types of problems as experienced in drought relief programs)
and to organize communities around drought alleviation techniques.
This argument has its merits, particularly since people said that communities that
had some form of organization prior to the drought were the ones that were more
successful in organizing around the 1987-88 drought relief effort--they showed more
initiative, and were more responsive to the demands that the program made on them.
Likewise, a municipio with a pre-existing committee that could oversee relief would be
ready to respond to future emergencies.
However, a permanent arrangement would probably require the involvement of
the mayor as central government couldn't afford politically to isolate a mayor from
programs that permanently channeled state funds to the municipio. This was particularly
true in the case of the government of Ceard which, in the years following 1988, aimed to
increase the autonomy of local governments. 14 Following this therefore, the government
created committees which combined GAC-like groups with the mayor in the 1990
drought. However, evidence from the field suggests that this combination did not prevent
the pre-1987 problems from emerging, and that partial blame rested on the mayors'
14A past secretary reported that one of the aims of the government was to gradually give more
responsibility to the municipios particularly following the reforms of the New Brazilian Constitution of
1988.
involvement. Given the re-emerging problems, in 1992 the governor eliminated the
active participation of the group so that, once more, the program could work around the
mayor. It would seem, therefore, that a GAC-like, mayor-free structure such as that used
in 1987 is a better vehicle for drought relief programs and, perhaps, performs best as a
prestigious, temporary institution, utilized when the threat of local corruption prevails.' 5
Some might argue that, in a way, the corruption in previous droughts resulted
from the state's decision to decentralize some of its responsibility by giving local
landowners and politicians substantial control over the projects. What is interesting is
that although decentralization failed previously, the state did not revert to a completely
centralized system during the 1987 drought but, rather, extended the task to a group of
actors like the GACs. In so doing they allowed control to stay at the local level but
ensured that the control was held by many residents rather than a few powerful
landowners and politicians.16
The GACs provided a means through which PAPCS could administer the drought
relief process more effectively,17 while validating the knowledge and ability of municipal
level residents to monitor the program and without having to employ personnel to work
throughout the state. The following chapter describes another set of players,
EMATERCE agents, who represented the single most active state agency in drought
relief both in terms of state coverage and its role in providing technical and administrative
support at the municipal level.
15Particularly in election years when clientelism peaks and public funding is more likely to go
astray. 16See Smucker et al. (1979) who argues that decentralized management of public works programs
is effective only when those managing the program at the local level represent the victims.
17Chudy (1984) says that a "highly decentralized" management system in relief programs are
overall more effective at assisting the poor.
CHAPTER SIX
GIVING CREDENCE TO AN EXISTING NETWORK.
THE CASE OF EMATERCE.
In 1987 the state government expanded the role of agricultural agents in drought
relief. Whereas prior to 1987, EMATERCE (the state agency for technical assistance and
rural extension) had served only as technical auxiliary to GESCAP, (the main agency in
charge of the relief effort at both the state and municipal level), in 1987 the state assigned
EMATERCE the major task of administering the drought-relief effort at the municipal
and community level, and GESCAP (whose name had since been changed to CEDEC),
the separate task of coordinating the relief effort from Fortaleza, routinely visiting the
interior and attending to problems as they arose. Both agencies fell under the jurisdiction
of the Department of Social Programs, having transferred from the Department of
Agriculture; CEDEC permanently, and EMATERCE solely for the purpose of the 1987-
1988 drought relief effort. Although agents from other state agencies also played a role
in drought relief, their role was mainly to provide mainly technical support and was
somewhat secondary to the role of EMATERCE. EMATERCE managed the highest
proportion of workers in the employment scheme across the state, and worked in more
municipios than did other state agencies. 1 This chapter concentrates on the role of
EMATERCE, who played a more critical role in PAPCS.
With their expanded role, and now based in the department heading PAPCS,
EMATERCE agents devoted much more of their time to relief work in the 1987-1988
drought than they had in previous emergencies. They played three main functions. First,
they provided technical assistance to drought-related projects just as they had done in
previous projects. For example, when in one municipio, everyone in the town voted to
build a new type of well that they heard was being constructed in another municipio, the
1See chapter three for a breakdown of workers by agencies.
extension agent, knowing that that particular type of well was technically inappropriate
(due to the type of soil), persuaded the community to consider alternatives. Second, they
helped to organize communities, guide them in their new decision-making role, and
provide logistic support such as paying the work program employees bi-weekly. An
extension agent described their interaction with communities as follows:
Under PAPCS, EMATERCE agents went around to communities and held meetings. If
weekdays were inconvenient, agents even went on Sundays to convene the residents and
conduct the voting process. In the meetings, EMATERCE agents would run down the
name of residents and one by one, people would say whether or not the person was
eligible for assistance. The decisions were often difficult and slow. Some agents spent
over three hours with a given community (which could range from five families to as
many as 50 families) agonizing over the final selections.
Last, in accordance with the PAPCS guidelines, EMATERCE agents functioned
as members of the GACs and were often selected by GAC members to be coordinator of
the group.
By giving an agency already well respected in the rural areas for its agricultural
work this prominent role in the relief effort, the state took a great step towards changing
the image of relief delivery at the municipal level. In comparison with GESCAP, the
rapport that EMATERCE had with the population in the interior was extraordinary. By
using this agency therefore, the state not only acknowledged the wealth of experience that
extension agents had, but also strategically placed relief delivery in the hands of visible,
well-known and respected actors in an attempt to reduce the propensity of relief agents
being undermined. I will detail the factors that led the government to view EMATERCE
as advantageous for the drought relief effort.
Factors Making EMATERCE's Role Advantageous
Standard EMATERCE work fed into drought relief work
Agricultural extension agents were effective partly because during the emergency
they undertook tasks similar to those that they undertook in their standard extension
work. Therefore, even though it appeared that agricultural workers were doing
"extracurricular" activities when they performed emergency activities during droughts,
the fact is that they were essentially doing what they normally did, and this familiarity
enabled them to perform well.
This comes as a surprise since I began the research viewing relief work as an
"extracurricular" activity and consequently assumed that drought relief work was
burdensome to agricultural extension agents. The fact that many state officials argued
prior to 1987 that extension agents spent "too much" time on drought relief work,
implying that it was outside the realm of their jobs compounded this belief. Whereas it is
standard in many countries for extension agents to spend almost all their time doing
strictly agricultural work (in non-emergency time),2 during emergency droughts
EMATERCE agents spend over 50% of their time doing relief work, 3 managing and
monitoring projects in various communities. Given this increased "burden," I assumed
that the motivation and productivity level of EMATERCE agents would be low enough to
hinder the statewide relief effort.4 After all, civil servants often resist doing work beyond
their standard roles, particularly since they perceive this as added responsibility for the
same pay.
Yet, to my surprise, I found the opposite: in the municipios that I visited,
extension agents saw themselves as being the best people to carry out drought relief
work. They assumed that relief work was part of their "unwritten" job description,
particularly because they were already familiar with helping people to organize,
prioritize, specify demands and do construction work. I heard few complaints from
extension agents about the fact that they spent most of their time doing drought work for
2Moore (1984) states that extension agents in India spend about 80% of their time doing
agricultural work.
3From an interview with a upper level EMATERCE officer. This is particularly interesting since
in some of the documents outlining the POLONORDESTE program, in which extension agents gained
greater importance, the issue of drought relief work is never raised.
4Moore (1984) argues that low morale poses one of the greatest threats to extension agents
as many as eight months out of the year.5 Their response was also partially due to the
fact that during the drought period, agents get more transportation and fuel and so can
spend more time in the field which they see as a central component (and pleasure) of their
work. Whereas agents in one municipio said that in non-crisis time they go to the field as
few as three times per month, during the drought crisis period they go as often as three
times per week. 6
There are many similarities between the agricultural work and relief work. Often,
EMATERCE agents used their experience from working under PAPP (a large rural
development program for small farmers) 7 to organize communities under PAPCS. PAPP
had required them to work closely with small farmers and residents' associations and
cooperatives and to make requests for agricultural equipment in the same way that
PAPCS required them to meet with drought victims and make requests for public works
projects.
EMATERCE agents often have to oversee food distribution in drought relief
programs. In their regular role,8 EMATERCE agents have often had to assemble
communities for seed distribution and other types of meetings. Through experience, they
know that if they make announcements on the radio, they should do so at a time when the
farmers will most likely be at home. Although seemingly obvious, accounts of
development projects often tell of state agencies and NGOs failing to attract local people
to meetings and projects because they neglect to publicize them in a way that the poor
will have access to the information or be attracted to them.9 Through seed distribution,
5This is similar to what took place when an agricultural program in India was implemented in the
time of a crisis. The crisis was so grave that agricultural agents became motivated to produce good results,
to the extent that their work improved (Moore 1984).
6Based on 1992 experience.
7PAPP followed POLONORDESTE. One EMATERCE respondent noted that under this program
the role of agriculture extension expanded to take on a more educational and social function under this
program.
8This is based on an experience of the drought of 1992.
9This has been the failure of development projects worldwide in the past. For example, NGOs
have scheduled community planning meetings at a time when the target group has not been able to attend.
This task requires the everyday experience of people who know the target group well.
EMATERCE personnel also know how to distribute relief supplies in ways that decrease
the possibility of corruption and fraud in communities.
The type of technical advice that EMATERCE gave during PAPCS was similar to
the type it gave while doing agricultural work. Farmers build small wells at all times of
year. Many communities have resident "diviners," local people who are skilled at
determining where underground water exists for possible locations of wells. As technical
advisors however, EMATERCE agents sometimes have to show where diviners are
mistaken--the area might have too many rocks, making dynamiting a difficult exercise.
In the same way that emergency time work requires EMATERCE to perform
many varied tasks, so too does non-emergency work. The extent to which EMATERCE
wears various hats and plays many roles effectively in the rural areas is expressed in the
form of a joke, relayed by the head of a local EMATERCE office.
There is a refrigerator in Brazil that carries the brand name 'Counsel.' The refrigerator
advertisement shows various members of a family coming up to the mother, each asking
for something different, from fish to fruit to dairy products, to things that one would not
even find in a refrigerator. Each time, regardless of the request, the mother automatically
responded 'Counsel,' referring to the refrigerator. The point was that the refrigerator had
everything that the family could ever demand.
Now, people refer to EMATERCE in the same way. Because EMATERCE is
seen as the main state agency in the rural areas, whenever there is a task to be done there,
related or unrelated to agricultural work, people respond 'Counsel,' in reference to
EMATERCE, a 'catch all' agency. EMATERCE delivers, regardless of the task.
In the 1987-88 drought relief program the fact that the government recognized
EMATERCE's breadth of involvement and experience in the rural area was crucial for the
program's success. This new approach to the function of extension agents in relief
programs should perhaps lead government officials to think a little differently about the
role of agricultural extension agencies in rural areas. In expanding its vision of
EMATERCE while at the same time not necessarily detracting from the standard work
of EMATERCE the state improved the effectiveness of PAPCS.
EMATERCE was widely dispersed throughout the state,
The state used EMATERCE since its extension agents were already located in the
interior and were the single state contact for many isolated, and in many cases, most
drought-stricken communities. Because the drought stricken population of Ceard is so
widely dispersed, it was important to utilize an institutional structure that was just as
dispersed as the population and could establish contact with the communities within a
short period of time and without a great deal of institutional confusion. 10 EMATERCE
already had offices in the interior and was in a position to provide technical and
administrative support. 11 The previously utilized GESCAP had a much smaller
workforce and were unable to cover the territory that EMATERCE did.
The statewide EMATERCE network also facilitated horizontal communication
across the various municipios. Agents talk with their colleagues (many of whom they
know from their training) in other municipios about difficulties in relief programs, where
improvements can be made, etc. In one such case an agent who needed a particular car
part for one of the scarce agency vehicles, learned from a colleague in another municipio
that he could get the badly needed part in that municipio--a seemingly trivial piece of
information but vital to the work of extension agents. EMATERCE workers with whom I
spoke could explain in depth about the general conditions, the progress of the drought
program in other municipios, and other information that enhanced their own work.
With their prior experience in the communities EMATERCE agents were able to
perform much more effectively than other state agents who were normally based in
Fortaleza. As one resident said:
Agents understand the problems within the communities, know the "troublemakers," and
can perceive when the communities need their intervention. For example, when one
person starts to control a meeting they know how to resolve the problem.
Knowing the history of a given community and its residents greatly increased
agents' ability to assist communities appropriately. In addition
Residents insist that it is essential to work closely with an agent that they already know
and trust. Likewise, agents believe that it is easier to work with communities with whom
they are already familiar.
10Tendler (1982b) says that extension agents form a bureaucratic stronghold in rural areas because
of their dispersion across the state.
11Thomas (1986) says that the poor performance in many Food for Work Programs is partially due
to a lack of management resources and logistic capacity.
EMATERCE's role was ambiguous
There is a certain ambiguity in the persona of EMATERCE workers. In one
respect they represent educated elite, with some being university trained. This allows
them to interact with other professionals in the interior. In another respect, they work
closely with the farmers, many of them poor, and often speak on their behalf.
EMATERCE workers have long maintained a working relationship with farmers and
rural residents in rural Ceard,12 and are respected for having chosen to work in rural areas
in spite of being educated elite. Also, EMATERCE agents represent the state and are
responsible for the funding coming from the state for projects.
The fact that EMATERCE maintained a relationship with all players at the local
level, yet represented something different to each group of players enhanced the ability to
EMATERCE agents to perform well. For example, EMATERCE sided with the plight of
poor farmers in the 1987 drought. However, they also represented the state bureaucracy.
Their mixed role allowed them to explain to farmers that funding was limited, while at
the same time pressuring the government to pay workers promptly. Their status as
brokers enhanced the relief effort.13
A current example of the positive effects of having multiple roles comes from the
Iguatu farmer demonstration in July 1992 just prior to the dry season. The farmers
threatened to loot the town shops and food stores if they didn't receive food and
employment from the state. A prominent and well-liked EMATERCE employee,
representing the mayor, calmed the crowd. The workers listened to him, giving him the
legitimacy that they would not have given the mayor. They knew that he didn't involve
himself with local (and reputedly corrupt) politics, that he was familiar with the
12Tendler (1982b, 40) points out that extension agents did not always maintain a good relationship
with the poor and previously maintained a closer relation with rural landowning elites. At one stage the
elites supported EMATERCE's role in providing credit and other agricultural benefits. However, when the
World Bank's shifted its emphasis to providing more services and subsidies to the poor, EMATERCE had
to serve "new clients," the poor, to the detriment of the previous, elite clientele.
13This is similar to Tendler's (1982a) view of NGOs as brokers and Wells' (1982) argument that
says that extension agents, who have state connections yet act on behalf of the poor make ideal brokers for
the poor and other special interest groups that they work for.
conditions in all the towns, and that he would personally assist with food distribution
when it arrived. Therefore farmers perceived him as a state representative with the
interest of the workers at heart. He was able to "defend" the state and explain that
funding for the farmers had not yet arrived from Fortaleza. One farmer noted that his talk
probably prevented the workers from looting and rioting that day. The municpio's elites
also supported this agent in his work, awarding him a prize at the municipio's Who's Who
Award Ceremony. This acceptance from all parties enabled him to bridge the gap
between the rural people and residents in the sede.
This multiple image of EMATERCE allowed them flexibility to perform their
tasks and work effectively with four groups of players: victims in communities, elites in
the sede and local and Fortaleza-based state administrators. That they were able to work
across various groups was a luxury that few other state players possessed. What was
important was that the state in 1987 took advantage of this asset, leading EMATERCE
agents to treat their role in relief very seriously, and as a result, perform well as public-
minded officials, refraining for the most part from corruption.
EMATERCE's Status Contributed to Good Performance
First, an official in the Department of Social Programs argued that EMATERCE,
whose "reputation as a state agency doing agricultural work had begun to diminish while
in the Department of Agriculture" gained some prestige simply by being transferred to
the Department of Social Programs where state officials considered its role as vital. One
EMATERCE field worker said that the fact that the state government in 1987 treated
extension agents as "authority" figures contributed to EMATERCE agents feeling better
about their work. 14
Second, EMATERCE looked positively at drought work because communities respected
their roles. Agents gained status because victims saw them as non-partisan and therefore
14See Tendler (1991, 13) who argues that changing agency staff from roles as project coordinators
to roles in which they actively assist with implementation leads to increased morale.
objective and trustworthy civil servants. 15 EMATERCE agents also knew that
communities needing assistance preferred to work with them rather than rely on
councilmen for favors even though EMATERCE agents were less likely to have
disposable funds to offer them. One farmer even referred to his community's extension
agent as a "savior," noting that the work of the extension agent was the most vital part of
drought alleviation. Communities credited agents for their technical knowledge, and their
willingness to meet and assist them in their communities.
Third, EMATERCE agents were motivated by their roles in the GAC. As
coordinators they led lawyers, merchants and large landowners who, in any other setting,
would otherwise have been considered their superiors by virtue of class and status in the
community.16
These factors led to increased motivation and provided incentives for good
performance in drought relief, debunking the perception that relief work was inferior to
the work of extension agents and did not utilize their potential capacity.
By giving credence to EMATERCE in PAPCS, the state built on already existing
experience, technical knowledge and a link with isolated communities. Furthermore,
using EMATERCE, an already functioning institution, was cost effective as the state did
not have to use scarce resources to develop a special cadre of professionals large enough
to effectively advise and manage the delivery of relief in communities scattered across
170 municipios across the state. The state's acknowledgment of EMATERCE agents as
competent professionals and as a vital link in the delivery of relief services coupled with
the other innovations (community involvement and municipal administration) allowed the
institutional structure of PAPCS to work well in the 1987-1988 drought.
15People did not always view them as such. I heard of municipios in which agents immersed
themselves in political activities.16A CEDEC official said that as many as 80% of the EMATERCE GAC coordinators went on to
win political roles (as councilpeople or mayors) after the drought, suggesting that they gained some clout
from their role in the program.
CONCLUSION
Several key lessons can be learned from this case. The state showed how
inexpensive yet effective simple innovations helped address some of the root causes of
the devastating effects of the drought and the major obstacles which prevented effective
relief. For the most part, what the state did was a) decentralize some of its decisions and
tasks, b) maximize the use of already existing state employees, and c) create new roles for
municipal and community players who were previously bystanders of relief. Although
many argue that decentralization can be problematic since needed skills are often not
available at the local level (Smoke, Prud'homme, and Khellaf 1992), the state showed that
when the tasks were simple, the skills were available and the people were willing to be
involved community involvement was not only possible but greatly beneficial.
Summarized below are the main lessons of the program.
The state built on the unique components of extension work (their role as brokers,
their extensive network and their technical expertise in areas of rural technology) and
successfully converted it into a useful tool for relief delivery. By building on existing
knowledge and experience, the program created a cadre of relief experts who required no
additional training, and who still had their permanent jobs to return to once the crisis was
over. The state's use of agricultural extension agents for relief delivery challenged the
conventional vision of extension agents, leading us to think about how state workers'
function can be adapted for alternative yet appropriate purposes when the need arises.
The state capitalized on the growing trend of community involvement. While one
could argue that this was a natural progression since the country was undergoing a
process of democratization, the state ingeniously channeled this to benefit both the
drought relief program and the recipients of relief themselves. Not only were local rural
community residents skilled enough to decide who the poorest people in the communities
were, and which projects would most suit their needs, but they were actually the best
candidates for the task because they were informed and the ones in need.
The state developed the role of leaders in the municipios, giving interest group
leaders, state representatives and landowners positions of public responsibility. This, in
turn, increased the notion of accountability within the municipios, which helped to
circumvent some of the traditional problems of relief skimming.
Finally, the state, in developing new roles for the above mentioned actors, shifted
much of the "burden" of the program monitoring away from Fortaleza. By decentralizing
the task of monitoring, supervision, and relatively simple decision-making, the state was
able to gather vital information and constant feedback from municipios regarding the
problems and progress of the program. The drought relief programs prior to 1987 never
successfully managed to fulfill these tasks efficiently, simply because the onus of the
program was so heavily concentrated in Fortaleza and because there was insufficient
control over the program at the municipal level.
The drought relief program of 1987 showed Ceard alleviating some of the major
problems by focusing not only on the "spoils" of relief, but also, to a large extent, on the
social factors which consistently undermined the state's efforts to provide relief.
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